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Abstract.  We estimate individual risk attitudes using controlled experiments in the
field in Denmark.  These risk preferences are elicited by means of field experiments
involving real monetary rewards.  The experiments were carried out across Denmark
using a representative sample of 253 people between 19 and 75 years of age.  Risk
attitudes are estimated for various individuals differentiated by socio-demographic
characteristics such as income and age. Our results indicate that the average Dane is
risk averse, and that risk neutrality is an inappropriate assumption to apply.  We also
find that risk attitudes do vary significantly with respect to several important socio-
demographic variables.  These conclusions are robust to the use of relatively flexible
specifications of risk preferences. When individual characteristics of the sample are
ignored, relative risk aversion appears not to be constant over the domain of income
considered here, and rises rapidly as income increases above “small” amounts.
However, relative risk aversion appears to be constant when one corrects for
individual heterogeneity, although there is considerable uncertainty in the
characterization of risk attitudes for low stakes.
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http://exlab.bus.ucf.edu.1  We elicit risk attitudes for individuals.  To the extent that the characteristics of individuals are used
to define “representative households,” we can refer to the individual and the household interchangeably.
However, we remain agnostic concerning the way in which the individual risk attitudes of individual
household members are aggregated into one household risk attitude.
2 Following Rabin [2000], there are some specifications of expected utility theory for which a finding
of risk aversion at these levels of income is incoherent. This argument does not apply if expected utility theory
is defined over income earned during the experiment, rather than over terminal lifetime wealth. Appendix A
reviews this argument, and its relevance for experimental studies of risk aversion.
3 Following the taxonomy developed by Harrison and List [2003], we conduct artefactual field
experiments.
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Assumptions about risk attitudes play a central role in the analysis of major economic
decisions such as education, employment, health care, and retirement.  Whenever costs and benefits
for a household or individual are uncertain, it is essential that one calculate certainty equivalents in
order to undertake meaningful comparisons.  In most cases welfare analysts implicitly assume risk
neutrality as the basis for these calculations, although it is a priori plausible that risk aversion might
be very high for some vulnerable segments of the population.  In fact, since risk attitudes are a
reflection of subjective preferences, one would expect a priori that they would differ across
individuals.
1
We elicit measures of individual risk attitudes from subjects in Denmark in order to test
three substantive hypotheses.  The first hypothesis is that risk attitudes differ significantly from risk
neutrality, such that the implicit assumption in cost-benefit analysis should be reviewed.
2  The second
hypothesis is that there are identifiable segments of the population that exhibit significant differences in risk
attitudes, such that analysts should allow for heterogeneity when they can identify those segments.
The third hypothesis is that relative risk aversion is not constant with respect to the income levels of the
lottery prizes considered, such that one should avoid popular constant relative risk aversion
specifications for policies defined over non-trivial income changes.
We use survey questions with real monetary rewards to elicit risk attitudes and demonstrate
the methodological complementarity between lab and field experiments.
3 The survey questions are
based on those designed by Holt and Laury [2002], who elicited risk attitudes for university students
using controlled laboratory experiments. We apply extended versions of  their experimental-2-
procedures, but employ subjects that are normally encountered in field surveys.  Our field
experiments were carried out across Denmark for the Danish government, using a nationally
representative sample of 253 people between 19 and 75 years of age.
Our results indicate that the average Dane is risk averse, and that risk neutrality is an
inappropriate assumption to apply.  We also find that risk attitudes do vary significantly with respect
to several important socio-demographic variables.  These general conclusions are robust to the use
of relatively flexible specifications of risk preferences. Relative risk aversion appear to vary over the
domain of income considered here, rising rapidly as income increases above “small” amounts, if one
fails to account for individual heterogeneity in risk attitudes. We do account for that heterogeneity,
and find that the assumption of constant relative risk aversion is acceptable over the domain of
income considered. However, there is considerable uncertainty in the estimation of risk attitudes for
small amounts of income. In that domain one cannot reject the hypothesis that subjects are risk
neutral or even risk loving, simply because the precision of the estimates is so poor. Our results
consistently support the need to recognize the heterogeneity of risk attitudes across individual
subjects. This result has important implications for the characterization of risk attitudes in policy
applications, theoretical modeling, and experimental economics.
  In section 1 we review the logic of our experimental design.  We propose several extensions
of the basic laboratory procedure designed to elicit more precise responses and check for robustness
to framing effects.  These extensions provide several methodological improvements in the risk
elicitation procedure, which are of independent interest.  Section 2 explains the field experiments
conducted, with additional details on procedures provided in Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sullivan
[2004].  Section 3 examines the results and relates them to those found in the existing literature.  We
also demonstrate how our design allows one to “calibrate” for possible framing effects, and evaluate
relatively flexible functional forms for risk preferences.
At a methodological level, we demonstrate that it is possible to elicit risk attitudes in a field
experiment that reflects the population of a country. We concede that Denmark is a remarkable4 The MPL appears to have been first used in pricing experiments by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler
[1990], and has been adopted in recent discount rate experiments by Coller and Williams [1999]. It has a
longer history in the elicitation of hypothetical valuation responses in “contingent valuation” survey settings,
as discussed by Mitchell and Carson [1989; p. 100, fn. 14]. The test devised by HL is closely related to one
developed by Murnighan, Roth and Schoumaker [1988] to measure the degree of risk aversion of subjects in
bargaining experiments.
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country in which to recruit subjects and undertake field experiments – over 94% of the field subjects
we recruited actually turned up for their sessions! The potential importance of eliciting risk attitudes
for policy evaluation justifies the development of procedures to rigorously elicit risk attitudes as one
component of large-scale surveys that are routinely conducted in many countries. Our procedures
should serve as a “best-case” guide to such efforts in the future.
1. Experimental Design
A.  The Basic Elicitation Procedure
Holt and Laury [2002] (HL) devise a simple experimental measure for risk aversion using a
multiple price list (MPL) design.
4 Each subject is presented with a choice between two lotteries,
which we call A or B. Table 1 illustrates the basic payoff matrix presented to subjects. The first row
shows that lottery A offered a 10% chance of receiving $2 and a 90% chance of receiving $1.60. The
expected value of this lottery, EV
A, is shown in the third-last column as $1.64, although the EV
columns were not presented to subjects.  Similarly, lottery B in the first row has chances of payoffs
of $3.85 and $0.10, for an expected value of $0.48. Thus the two lotteries have a relatively large
difference in expected values, in this case $1.17. As one proceeds down the matrix, the expected
value of both lotteries increases, but the expected value of lottery B becomes greater than the
expected value of lottery A.
The subject chooses A or B in each row, and one row is later selected at random for payout
for that subject. The logic behind this test for risk aversion is that only risk-loving subjects would
take lottery B in the first row, and only risk-averse subjects would take lottery A in the second last
row. Assuming local non-satiation, the last row is simply a test that the subject understood the5 Some subjects switched several times, but the minimum switch point is always well-defined. It turns
out not to make much difference how one handles these “multiple switch” subjects, but our analysis and the
analysis of HL consider the effect of accounting for them in different ways explained below.
6  With this parameterization, r = 0 denotes risk neutral behavior, r > 0 denotes risk aversion, and r <
0 denotes risk loving.  When r =1, U(m) = ln(m).
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instructions, and has no relevance for risk aversion at all. A risk neutral subject should switch from
choosing A to B when the EV of each is about the same, so a risk-neutral subject would choose A
for the first four rows and B thereafter.
These data may be analyzed using a variety of statistical models. Each subject made 10
responses.  The responses can be reduced to a scalar if one looks at the lowest row in Table 1 at
which the subject “switched” over from lottery A to lottery B.
5  This reduces the response to a scalar
for each subject and task, but a scalar that takes on integer values between 0 and 10. Alternatively,
one could study the effects of experimental conditions in terms of the constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) characterization, employing an interval regression model. The CRRA utility is defined as
U(y) = (y
1- r )/(1- r), where r is the CRRA coefficient.
6  The dependant variable in the interval
regression model is the CRRA interval that subjects implicitly choose when they switch from lottery
A to lottery B. For each row of panel A in Table 1, one can calculate the implied bounds on the
CRRA coefficient, and these are in fact reported by HL [2002; Table 3].  These intervals are shown
in the final column of Table 1.  Thus, for example, a subject that made 5 safe choices and then
switched to the risky alternatives would have revealed a CRRA interval between 0.14 and 0.41, and a
subject that made 7 safe choices would have revealed a CRRA interval between 0.68 and 0.97, and
so on.
HL also utilize a variant of the Expo-Power (EP) utility function proposed by Saha [1993],
which is more general than the CRRA characterization. The EP function is defined as  u(y) = [1-
exp(-"y
1-r)]/", where y is income and " and r are parameters to be estimated.  Relative risk aversion
(RRA) is then r + "(1-r)y
1-r.  So RRA varies with income if " … 0. This function nests CRRA (as "
tends to 0) and CARA (as r tends to 0). HL estimate this function assuming that every subject has
the same risk preference. They rely on a “noise parameter” to accommodate the obvious differences-5-
in risk choices across subjects, but do not allow risk preferences to vary with observable socio-
demographic characteristics as we do later.
Our approach is to use the CRRA specification for basic analysis of results, and then
examine robustness using EP specifications.
B.  Extensions
We expand the HL design, with some simple modifications to allow a richer characterization
of the utility function and the reliability of the elicitation procedure.
Variations in the Income Domain
The design used by HL called for each subject to be given choices over four lottery prizes
and for there to be one major scale change for all real payoffs. We also want to allow for changes in
the value of prizes, so that we have data for the same subject over more than four prizes and can
generate better characterizations of their risk attitudes.
We  undertake four separate risk aversion tasks with each subject, each with different prizes
designed so that all 16 prizes span the range of income that we seek to estimate risk aversion over.
Ideally, we would have a roughly even span of prizes so that we can evaluate the utility function for
the individual at different income levels and know that there were some response at or near that
level. The four sets of prizes are as follows, in Danish kroner (DKK), with the two prizes for lottery
A listed first and the two prizes for lottery B listed next: (A1: 2000, 1600; B1: 3850, 100), (A2: 2250,
1500; B2: 4000, 500), (A3: 2000, 1750; B3: 4000, 150), and (A4: 2500, 1000; B4: 4500, 50). At the
time of the first phase of the experiments, the exchange rate was approximately 6.55 DKK per U.S.
dollar, so these prizes range from approximately $7.65 to $687.
This set of prizes generates an array of possible CRRA values.  For example, set 1 generates
CRRA intervals at the switch points of -1.71, -0.95, -0.49, -0.14, 0.15, 0.41, 0.68, 0.97 and 1.37.  The
other sets generate different CRRA intervals, such that all four sets span 36 distinct CRRA values7 The second set generates CRRA values of -1.45, -0.72, -0.25, 0.13, 0.47, 0.80, 1.16, 1.59 and 2.21;
the third set generates values of -1.84, -1.101, -0.52, -0.14, 0.17, 0.46, 0.75, 1.07 and 1.51; and the fourth set
generates values of -0.75, -0.32, -0.05, 0.16, 0.34, 0.52, 0.70, 0.91 and 1.20.
8 If the subject always chooses A, or indicates Indifference for any of the decision rows, there are no
additional decisions required and the task is completed.
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between -1.84 and 2.21, with roughly 60% of the CRRA values reflecting risk aversion.
7 Any scaling
of the prizes that is common within a set will preserve the implied CRRA coefficients, so this design
could also be used with smaller or larger payoffs.
We ask the subject to respond to all four risk aversion tasks in the same order and then
randomly decide which one to play out. Budget constraints precluded paying all subjects, so each
subject is given a 10% chance of actually receiving the payment associated with his decision.
Iterating the MPL
It is possible to extend the MPL to allow more refined elicitation of the true risk attitude,
and yet retain the transparency of the incentives of the basic MPL. We do so in the form of a
computerized variant on the basic MPL format which we call an Iterative MPL (iMPL).
The basic MPL is the standard format in which the subject sees a fixed array of paired
options and chooses one for each row. It allows subjects to switch back and forth as they like, and
has already been used in many experiments.  The iMPL format extends this by first asking the
subject to simply choose the row at which he wants to first switch from option A to option B,
assuming monotonicity of the underlying preferences to automatically fill out the remaining choices. 
The second extension of the MPL format is to then allow the individual to make choices from
refined options within the option last chosen. That is, if someone decides at some stage to switch
from option A to option B between probability values of 0.1 and 0.2, the next stage of an iMPL
would then prompt the subject to make more choices within this interval, to refine the values
elicited.
8 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate Level 1 and Level 2, respectively, of an iMPL.  In Level 1 the
illustrative subject first chooses B when the interest rate is between 0.3 and 0.4, so that Level 29   The iterative format has some “smarts” built into it: when the values being elicited drop to some
specified perceptive threshold (e.g., set to a 1-in-100 die throw), the iMPL collapses down to an endogenous
number of final rows and the elicitation task stops iterating after those responses are entered.
10  See Kirby and Marakoviƒ [1996], Kirby, Petry and Bickel [1999] and Eckel, Johnson and
Montmarquette [2002].
11 A parallel issue arises in the use of incentive-compatible auction institutions to elicit valuations for
private goods.  One might be interested in testing if subjects behave as if they understand that truthfully
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presents the subject with 11 more choices within the interval 0.3 to 0.4.
9
The iMPL uses the same incentive logic as the MPL. After making all responses, the subject
has one row from the first table selected at random by the experimenter. In the MPL that is all there
is. In the iMPL, that is all there is if the row selected at random by the experimenter is not the one
that the subject switched at in Level 1. If it is the row that the subject switched at, another random
draw is made to pick a row in the Level 2 table, and so on.
As the subject iterates in the iMPL, the choices become more and more alike, by design.
Hence one would expect that greater cognitive effort would be needed to discriminate between
them. At some point we expect the subject to express indifference, which we account for in our
analysis by only considering the interval over which the subject could (strictly) discriminate.
Framing Effects
A natural concern with the MPL and iMPL is that it might encourage subjects to pick a
response in the middle of the table, independent of true valuations. There could be a psychological
bias towards the middle, although that is far from obvious a priori.
One solution to this concern which we find unattractive is to randomize the order of the
rows. This is popular in some experimental studies in psychology and economics which elicit
discount rates and risk attitudes using the MPL.
10  We find it unattractive for two reasons. First, if
there is a purely psychological anchoring effect towards the middle, this will do nothing but add
noise to the responses. Second, the valuation task is fundamentally harder from a cognitive
perspective if one shuffles the order of valuations across rows.  This harder task may be worthy of
study, but is a needless confound for our inferential purposes.
11revealing their valuation is in their best interest, or one might be interested in using that feature of the
institution to encourage truthful revelation.  In the latter case it would be appropriate to tell subjects the
(correct) logic underlying the incentive-compatibility of the institution, but that would obviously be an
unfortunate design choice in the former case.
12  The skewed frames does interact with the implementation of the iMPL. In the symmetric frame,
all intervals are 10 probability points wide, so that a second level is all that is needed to bring subject choices
down to precise intervals of 1 probability point. In the skewed frames, however, because the intervals vary in
size, a third level is required to bring choices down to this level of precision, and the number of decision rows
in Level 3 depends on the width of the interval in Level 1 at which the subject switches.
13 Further details are provided in Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sullivan [2004].
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Framing effects can be relatively easily tested for by varying the cardinal scale of the basic
MPL table, or by varying the number of intervals within a given cardinal range. If there is an effect
on responses, it will be easy to identify statistically and then to correct for in the data analysis. We
would not be surprised to find framing effects of this kind. They do not necessarily indicate a failure
of the traditional economic model, so much as a need to recognize that subjects in a lab setting use
all available information to identify a good valuation for a commodity (Harrison, Harstad and
Rutström [2004]). Thus it is important to be able to estimate the quantitative effect of certain frames
and then allow for them in subsequent statistical analysis.
We devise a test for framing effects by varying the cardinal scale of the MPL used in the risk
aversion task. Two asymmetric frames are developed: the skewHI treatment offers initial probabilities
of (0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1), while skewLO offers initial probabilities of (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and
1).  This treatment yields 6 decision rows in Level 1 of the iMPL, as opposed to the 10 rows in the
symmetric frame.
12  As suggested by the treatment names, skewLO (skewHI) is intended to skew
responses to be lower (higher) probabilities if subjects pick in the middle.
2. The Danish Experiments
A. Sampling Procedures
The sample for the field experiments was designed to generate a representative sample of the
adult Danish population. There were six steps in the construction of the sample,
13 essentially
following those employed in HLW:14  The initial letter of invitation included an answer form and a prepaid envelope, and the subject was
asked to answer within one week.  The same day we received the answer form, a reply letter was sent
confirming their participation in the meeting at the given location, date and time.  Every recruited subject was
reminded by mail or phone within a week of the meeting.  Both procedures were used for the first three
sessions, and attendance was almost 100% at these sessions.  We reminded subjects by mail for the remaining
sessions because this procedure is more convenient.
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• First, a random sample of 25,000 Danes was drawn from the Danish Civil Registration
Office in January 2003.  Only Danes born between 1927 and 1983 were included, thereby
restricting the age range of the target population to between 19 and 75.  For each person in
this random sample we had access to their name, address, county, municipality, birth date,
and sex. Due to the absence of names and/or addresses, 28 of these records were discarded.
• Second, we discarded 17 municipalities (including one county) from the population, due to
them being located in extraordinarily remote locations.  The population represented in these
locations amounts to less than 2% of the Danish population, or 493 individuals in our
sample from the civil registry.
• Third, we assigned each county either 1 session or 2 sessions, in rough proportionality to the
population of the county.  In total we assigned 20 sessions.  Each session consisted of two
sub-sessions at the same locale and date, one at 5pm and another at 8pm, and subjects were
allowed to choose which sub-session suited them best.
• Fourth, we divided 6 counties into two sub-groups because the distance between some
municipalities in the county and the location of the session would be too large.  A random
draw was made between the two sub-groups and the location selected, where the weights
reflect the relative size of the population in September 2002. 
• Fifth, we picked the first 30 or 60 randomly sorted records within each county, depending
on the number of sessions allocated to that county.  This provided a sub-sample of 600.
• Sixth, we mailed invitations to attend a session to the sub-sample of 600, offering each
person a choice of times for the session.
14  Response rates were low in some counties, so15 An additional 45 and 19 invitations were sent out in the second and third wave, respectively. The
first wave of invitations were sent out four weeks before the first session was scheduled, and we asked people
to reply within one week.  The second and third waves of invitations were sent out two and three weeks after
the first wave, respectively.
16  The response rate was 42.5% for the first wave, 20.0% percent for the second wave, and 22.1%
for the third wave.
17 The first person suffered from dementia and could not remember the instructions; the second
person was a 76 year old woman who was not able to control the mouse and eventually gave up; the third
person had just won a world championship in sailing and was too busy with interviews to stay for two hours;
and the fourth person was sent home because too many people showed up (one person came unexpected, and
we had only ten laptops available at that session).
18 Certain events might have plausibly triggered some of the no-shows: for example, 3 men did not
turn up on June 11, 2003, but that was the night that the Danish national soccer team played a qualifying
game for the European championships against Luxembourg that was not scheduled when we picked session
dates.
19 It is possible to undertake experiments over the web with a large sample of subjects drawn from
the population.  Kapteyn and Teppa [2003] illustrate how one can elicit hypothetical responses to elicit time
preferences using a panel of 2,000 Dutch households connected by home computer to surveys.  Although not
concerned with risk and time preferences directly, Hey [2002] illustrates how one can augment such electronic
panel surveys with real experiments. Donkers and van Soest [1999] elicit hypothetical risk and time
preferences from pre-existing panels of Dutch households being surveyed for other reasons.
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another 64 invitations were mailed out in these counties to newly drawn subjects.
15 Everyone
that gave a positive response was assigned to a session, and our recruited sample was 268.
16
   Attendance at the experimental sessions was extraordinarily high, including 4 persons who
did not respond to the letter of invitation but showed up unexpectedly and participated in the
experiment.  Four persons turned up for their session, but were not able to participate in the
experiments.
17
These experiments were conducted between June 2 and June 24, 2003, and a total of 253
subjects participated in the experiments.
18 Sample weights for the subjects in the experiment can be
constructed using the sample design, as explained by Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sullivan [2004].
B. Conduct of the Sessions
To minimize travel times for subjects, we reserved hotel meeting rooms in convenient
locations across Denmark in which to conduct sessions.
19 Because the sessions lasted for two hours,
light refreshments were provided. Participants met in groups of no more than 10. To conduct-11-
computerized experiments in the field, it was cost-effective to purchase laptop computers and
transport them to the meeting sites. It was not necessary to network the computers for these
experiments; the program ran independently on each computer and results for each subject saved on
that laptop.  Each subject was identified by a unique ID number. For the randomization procedures,
two bingo cages were used in each session, one containing 100 balls, and the other containing 3 to
11 balls, depending on the number of decision rows in the iMPL used in different treatments. We
found two bingo cages to be the most transparent and convenient way to generate random
outcomes in the experiments. 
To begin the sessions, subjects were welcomed and reminded that they were to be paid 500
DKK for their participation to cover travel costs as long as they were able to stay for the full two
hours required for the experiment. Anyone who was not able to stay for the full two hours was paid
100 DKK and excused from the experiment. The experimenters then asked for a volunteer to
inspect and verify the bingo cages and number of bingo balls.
Instructions for the experiment were provided on the computer screens, and subjects read
through the instructions while the experimenter read them aloud. The experimenters followed the
same script and procedures for each session, documented in Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sullivan
[2004].
The experiment was conducted in four parts. Part I consisted of a questionnaire collecting
subjects’ socio-demographic characteristics. Specifically, we collected information on age, gender,
size of town the subject resided in, type of residence, primary occupation during the last 12 months,
highest level of education, household type (viz., marital status and presence of younger or older
children), number of people employed in the household, total household income before taxes,
disposable household income, whether the subject is a smoker, and the number of cigarettes smoked
per day.  Part IV consisted of another questionnaire which elicits information on the subject’s
financial market instruments, and probes the subject for information on their expectations about
their future economic conditions and their own future financial position. The questionnaires are-12-
rather long, so we chose to divide them across Parts I and IV in order to reduce subject fatigue and
boredom. Part II consisted of the four risk aversion tasks, and Part III presented subjects with the
six discount rate tasks similar to those developed in Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002].
The four risk aversion tasks incorporate the incentive structure and assigned frames as
described earlier. After subjects completed the four tasks, several random outcomes were generated
in order to determine subject payments. For all subjects, one of the four tasks was chosen, then one
of the decision rows in that task was chosen. For those subjects whose decision at that row led to
Level 2, another random draw was required to choose a decision row in Level 2, and yet another
random draw was required should that decision have led a subject to Level 3 in the iMPL.  To
maintain anonymity we performed the draws without announcing to which subjects it would apply. 
In the case where a subject indicated Indifference for the chosen decision row, another random
draw determined whether the subject received the results from Lottery A or Lottery B. At this point
all subjects knew whether they were playing Lottery A or Lottery B, and another random draw
determined whether subjects were to receive the high payment or the low payment. Finally, a 10-
sided die was rolled for each subject. Any subject who received a roll of “0” received actual payment
according to that final outcome. All payments were made at the end of the experiment. 
A significant amount of time was spent training subjects on the iMPL and the randomization
procedures in Part II of the experiment. Subjects were given handouts containing examples of Level
1 and Level 2 of an iMPL that had been filled in. The training exercise explained the logic of the
iMPL and verified that subjects were able to correctly fill in an iMPL as shown in the handout. Next,
the experimenters illustrated the random procedures necessary to reach a final lottery outcome for
each possible choice in the chosen Level 1 decision row. Finally, a single trainer task was conducted
in which payments were in the form of candies. The ten-sided die was rolled for each subject, and
candies were given to each subject who received a roll of “0.”20 It is also consistent with estimates derived from models that entail joint tests of additional
hypotheses, such as “noisy” equilibrium behavior in first-price auctions or normal form games (Goeree, Holt
and Palfrey [2002][2003]) 
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3. Results
We present results by answering four questions. First, what is the general level of risk
aversion in the Danish population, at least over the domain of income considered here? Specifically,
is risk neutrality an acceptable hypothesis? Second, do risk attitudes vary with observable
demographics? Related to the possible effect of demographics, we can also ask if there are
significant effects on elicited risk attitudes from the task frame or task order. Third, how plausible is
it to assume that relative risk aversion is constant, again over the domain of income considered here?
Fourth, how does the characterization of risk change if one considers variants from the standard
expected utility theory model, such as “stochastic choice behavior” or non-standard “probability
weighting functions”?
A.  Risk Aversion
Figure 3 shows the observed distribution of risk attitudes in our sample, using the raw mid-
point of the elicited interval in the final iteration stage of the iMPL.  This distribution reflects the
symmetric menu treatment, which is the appropriate baseline to evaluate the asymmetric menu
treatments.  For this specification of CRRA, a value of 0 denotes risk neutrality, negative values
indicate risk-loving, and positive values indicate risk aversion.  Thus we see clear evidence of risk
aversion: the mean CRRA coefficient is 0.64. This distribution is consistent with comparable
estimates obtained in the United States, using college students and an MPL design, by Holt and
Laury [2002] and Harrison, Johnson, McInnes and Rutström [2003a][2003b].
20
Very few subjects exhibit any risk-preference. Friedman [1981] argues that subjects should
never exhibit risk-loving behavior in an artefactual experiment even if they are risk lovers, since they
have cheaper ways to purchase uncertainty in naturally occurring markets (e.g., purchase of lottery
tickets, or trips to a casino).  Our findings are consistent with this “censoring” hypothesis, although21 Harrison, Johnson, McInnes and Rutström [2003b] pursue this example in more detail, eliciting risk
attitudes from the same subjects that they elicit lottery choices from. Their in-sample design allows relatively
precise statements about the validity of EUT.
22 We do not make the assumption that indifference would imply a specific 50/50 split in observed
choices, since it does not follow from any standard axiom of EUT. Nor does it make sense: all sorts of non-
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it could just be that nobody in our sample was a risk lover before taking this censoring possibility
into account.
The unconditional data indicates that there is an effect on elicited risk aversion from the
framing treatments. Figure 4 displays these data in a manner that allows one to easily compare the
effects of the treatment.  The skewLO treatment resulted in an average CRRA of 0.43, and the
skewHI treatment resulted in an average CRRA of 0.95, each in the direction predicted a priori. Both
are consistent with the conclusion that subjects are risk averse, and the rejection of the hypothesis of
risk neutrality. Further comparison of the effect of these treatments on elicited risk aversion requires
that we condition on the observed differences in the samples assigned to each treatment. Although
subjects were randomly assigned to treatment, our samples are not large enough to be able to draw
reliable conclusions solely on the basis of randomization (nor were they designed to).
The precision with which one estimates risk attitudes is of great significance for the
interpretation of experimental data. If experimenters are unable to pin down the risk attitudes of
subjects, then tests that rely on risk attitudes have correspondingly lower statistical power. To take
one important example, consider the common ratio lottery pair widely used to evaluate EUT: the
parameters employed by Cubitt, Starmer and Sugden [1998] result in indifference between two of
the lotteries when subjects have a CRRA of 0.45. If the analyst cannot rule out the possibility that
the subject has a CRRA of 0.45, no amount of experimental data can disprove the hypothesis that
subjects are indifferent between the two lotteries.
21 For another example, consider the lottery pairs
used in the famous preference reversal experiments of Grether and Plott [1979]. In this case, by
design, the subject is indifferent between the lotteries if risk neutral. Hence, if one cannot rule out
risk neutrality, one cannot rule out the hypothesis that EUT has no predictions over these choice
tasks.
22economic biases might be expected to have a particularly strong role determining choice patterns when
economic factors play no role.
23 Several checks are undertaken for the specification.  First, collapsing the intervals down to their
mid-point allows a comparison of random-effects and fixed-effects specifications, and a Hausman test that
the random-effects specification is consistent.  There is no evidence that the random-effects specification is
inconsistent, using the 90% or so of responses that had an interval less than 7 percentage points.  Second, a
Breusch-Pagan test of the null hypothesis that there is no variance in the unobserved individual random
effects is convincingly rejected.  Third, since potentially fragile numerical quadrature methods are used to
estimate this specification, we checked for numerical stability as the number of quadrature points is varied,
and there was no evidence of instability in the log-likelihood or any of the individual coefficients. These
specification tests are performed for all of our panel models with similar results.
24 The term “unobserved individual effect” refers to the fact that we do observe that certain
observations come from the same individual, but that they might reflect characteristics of the individual that
we have not observed.
25 Levin, Snyder and Chapman [1988] and Powell and Ansic [1997] illustrate the experimental studies
undertaken in a settings in which the task was not abstract but there were no real earnings by subjects.
Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund [2002] and Holt and Laury [2002] conduct abstract experiments with real
rewards, and find no significant sex effects on elicited risk aversion when stakes are non-trivial. Schubert,
Brown, Gysler and Brachinger [1999] conduct abstract and non-abstract experiments with real rewards, and
conclude that women do appear to be more risk averse than men in abstract tasks in the gain frame, but that
this effect disappears with context. Unfortunately, they employed the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure
for eliciting certainty-equivalents, which is known to have poor incentive properties for experimental subjects.
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B.  Heterogeneity
In order to assess the importance of demographics on risk attitudes, we applied regression
models that condition on observable characteristics of the subjects. Table 2 provides the definitions
of the explanatory variables and summary statistics.  Table 3 displays the results from estimating a
panel interval regression model of the elicited CRRA values.  This model uses panel data since each
subject provided four responses, one for each stake condition.
23  Unobserved individual effects are
modeled using a random-effects specification.
24
We first consider the marginal effect of individual demographics, holding constant the
average value of other demographics, and then consider the joint effect of demographics.
Marginal Effects
We find no effect of sex on risk aversion. The absence of an effect of sex is noteworthy,
since it has been intensively studied using related experimental and survey methods, and has even
been the focus of theorizing about the role of evolution in forming preferences.
25Jianakoplos and Bernasek [1998] examine data from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances, and conclude that
single women are more risk averse in their financial choices than single men. Eckel and Grossman [2003]
review these studies and several unpublished studies. Rubin and Paul [1979] and Robson [1996] offer
evolutionary models of possible sex differences in risk aversion.
26 Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sullivan [2004] show that there is a significant effect on elicited risk
attitudes from both skewness treatments on the initial stage of the iMPL, but that the iterations of the iMPL
make that effect disappear for the skewLO treatment. Our analysis focusses on the final stage of the iMPL
procedure. Thus, one should be concerned about the possible effects of such framing on eliciting risk
attitudes if using the original MPL procedure.
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We do find an effect from age on risk attitudes. Younger individuals, under the age of 30,
tend to be more risk averse than those aged between 30 and 39, although the effect is not statistically
significant. After 40 subjects become significantly less risk averse than those aged betwee 30 and 39.
Again, we are controlling for other demographics that are plausibly associated with age, so these
effects occur even after allowing for those factors.
Skilled workers with some post-secondary education have significantly higher aversion to
risk. However, this is mitigated if the subject has experienced substantial higher education.
The variables skewLO and skewHI control for the frame used, as noted earlier. The skewHI
treatment is statistically significant, consistent with the display in the bottom panel of Figure 4.
Despite the unconditional estimates of mean CRRA differing from 0.64 to 0.43 when comparing the
symmetric and skewLO treatments, after controlling for differences in the samples the estimates
from Table 3 indicate that there is no significant effect from the skewLO treatment.
26
We observe that there is an effect on the CRRA coefficient from varying the lottery prizes
across the four tasks. There is a significant difference between Task 1 (the reference task for this
statistical analysis) and the other three tasks. In particular, Task 2 is associated with higher CRRA
responses, with a significant coefficient value of 0.32. The effect is smaller for Tasks 3 and 4 relative
to Task 1, but still positive and significant. We therefore confirm the findings reported in Holt and
Laury [2002] and Harrison, Johnson, McInnes, and Rutström [2003a][2003b] that the relative risk
aversion coefficient is not constant in the stakes, although here we varied the stakes in a non-
monotonic manner. One can either allow for this task effect with a CRRA characterization that
conditions on it, as we do here, or explore more flexible specifications than CRRA that might-17-
incorporate such variations within a single functional form. We pursue the latter path below.
Calibrating for Task Effects
Using the statistical model shown in Table 3, one can “calibrate” for an elicited distribution
of risk attitudes that does not have framing or order effects.  This entails generating predictions
using the estimated model in which these effects are removed.  In effect, the statistical model allows
one to predict how each subject would have responded if they had faced the symmetric menu and
only made one response, conditional on all of their other individual characteristics (such as age, sex,
etc.). Figure 5 shows the results of this exercise.  The top panel shows the observed distribution,
recognizing that this reflects predictions “observed” from the estimated statistical model in Table 3. 
The bottom panel shows the adjusted or calibrated distribution, which is generally less risk averse.
The constructive implication is that the existence of framing and task order effects can be
taken into account when drawing inferences from elicitation procedures.
Joint Effects
Now consider the effects of key demographic variables considered jointly. To do so we
generate predictions of the CRRA from the statistical model underlying Table 3, calibrating for task
effects, and simply stratify these predictions according to the demographic variable of interest. For
example, the men in our sample have a number of characteristics that differ from the women apart
from sex: they tend to be younger, have a higher income, live in Copenhagen, and are more likely to
be employed, a student, skilled with some post-secondary education, and have higher education.
Several of these characteristics had a significant marginal effect on risk attitudes, hence it is possible
that the joint effect of sex along with the characteristics correlated with it could have a significant
effect on risk attitudes.27 To better compare to previous studies, which sometimes only condition on sex, we also estimated
the interval regression model controlling only for sex and found no effects. Adding experimenter and task
effects did not change this result.
28 That is, it is entirely appropriate to maintain the CRRA assumption if one requires such structure in
order to generate predictions in some context. For example, there is a relatively elaborate theory of bidding
behavior in first-price auctions that relies on such representations of risk attitudes in order to solve for closed-
form Bayesian Nash equilibria. If the CRRA characterization is rejected for some income domains, then this
should be taken into account when evaluating tests of those bidding theories that treat CRRA as a maintained
assumption. Ideally one would go back and re-formulate the theory to accommodate such a result, but that
may not always be feasible. Moreover, even if CRRA is not globally valid over a given income domain, it may
still be locally valid of a subset of that domain.
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We find that sex still has no effect on risk aversion.
27 Being single is associated with a higher
aversion to risk, which suggests numerous jokes about the uncertainties of married life that we will
avoid. The effect is small (+0.08 in terms of CRRA), but statistically significant using a t-test. 
Owners of apartments or homes have a lower aversion to risk (-0.10), despite the fact that the
marginal effect of ownership was negligible. Retired individuals have much lower aversion to risk (-
0.19), in contrast to the absence of a significant marginal effect. The joint effect on risk aversion of
being a student is even larger than the marginal effect (+0.45 versus +0.33), whereas the joint effect
of being skilled with some post-secondary education is smaller (+0.25 versus +0.44). The joint effect
of having substantial higher education is only half of the marginal effect, but is statistically
significant. The joint effect of income levels is roughly the same as the marginal effect, but is
statistically significant. Thus lower income individuals have lower aversion to risk (-0.07), whereas
higher income individuals have greater aversion to risk (+0.06), each in relation to middle-income
individuals. This result is consistent with income being correlated with many of the other
characteristics included in our analysis, as might be expected. Living in greater Copenhagen is
associated with a significant joint effect, and is associated with higher risk aversion (+0.12). The
same effect is associated with living in a larger city, although it is slightly smaller (+0.08).
C.  Constancy of Relative Risk Aversion
The CRRA characterization of risk attitudes is popular in theoretical and applied work, no
doubt due to it’s tractability. If the analyst has the flexibility of allowing for other functional forms,
2829 See Camerer and Ho [1994; p.186-7] for a defence of this approach. They clearly propose it as an
exploratory approach to complement more elaborate analyses that allow for individual heterogeneity.
30 The likelihood function employs a probit function linking observed choices to the probability of
that choice conditional on parameter values.
31 The term “loss frame” refers to a task in which the choices are framed as losses from some
reference point. All of the non-hypothetical experiments that we know of provide a positive reference point
such that the subject cannot suffer a net loss (e.g., Battalio, Kagel and Jiranyakul [1990] and Kagel,
MacDonald and Battalio [1990]). An experiment in which the subject faces choices in which some outcomes
involved net losses should be referred to as involving choices in the loss domain. These are important semantics
when evaluating the experimental evidence accurately, since none of the non-hypothetical evidence pertains to
the loss domain.
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is it an appropriate functional form for the domain of incomes considered in our experiments? We
answer this question by characterizing our data with a more flexible functional form that nests
CRRA, the EP function introduced earlier, and directly testing for constancy of RRA.
We assume initially that we can empirically characterize the distribution of risk attitudes for
all subjects using one functional form, and assume away any heterogeneity across individuals. This
might seem like an odd thing to do, apart from the fact that it has been a popular thing to do.
29
Once we have evaluated the CRRA characterization in this setting, we consider the effects of
allowing heterogeneity in the EP characterization. Conditioning on individual heterogeneity makes a
significant difference to the characterization of risk attitudes, hence the need to proceed in these
steps.
Maximum likelihood estimates of the EP model can be used to generate the RRA for
different income levels.
30  Figure 6 displays the results, including a 95% confidence interval. The
estimates are very precise, even if they indicate large changes in the value of RRA over this income
domain. Using this characterization of utility, subjects behave as if risk-loving for the lower income
levels, up to around 1,250 DKK, and then become significantly risk averse. Their RRA is
proximately constant for income levels beyond 2,000 DK.
The most remarkable feature of Figure 6 is obviously the change from risk aversion for
higher income levels to risk loving for lower income levels. We did not conduct any experiments
that confronted subjects with a loss frame, so our analysis is restricted entirely to the gain frame.
31
This pattern is strikingly consistent with the “reflection effect,” proposed by Kahneman and Tversky32  Or, more accurately, wealth prior to the choice, since they explicitly view the utility/value function
as defined over gains and losses in income relative to that reference point. In their examples they always view
the subject as facing choices in the loss domain, at least as far as experimental income is concerned. But those
examples are clearly specific cases of their general version. Our results suggest that the reflection effect may
occur at positive income levels.
33 Again, we have no data on loss frame choices, but it is reasonable to extrapolate the qualitative
pattern of Figure 6 for low income levels. One could in fact undertake such an extrapolation numerically, but
that is not a convincing substitute for experiments in the loss frame. Recent experiments by Laury and Holt
[2002] and Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund [2002] suggest a significant reduction or elimination of the
reflection effect around zero when one moves from hypothetical tasks to non-hypothetical tasks. 
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[1979], at least in its most general form. The examples they provide, and their intuition, all refer to
risk loving behavior over losses and risk averse behavior over gains, but they are careful to always
refer to losses and gains relative to some “reference point” (e.g., p.279). Implicit in their hypothetical
experiments and intuition is a reference point of zero,
32 but that is not essential. If one modifies the
notion of a reference point to be some subjective income level below which the subject is “willing to
gamble,” then it need not be zero for all subjects. If non-experimental income is reliable and large
enough, a subject may well be willing to “take a flutter” for low income levels. In any event, this
pattern is observed clearly in Figure 6. This pattern is, in fact, exactly the one proposed by
Markowitz [1952], who Kahneman and Tversky [1979; p.268] cite as a precursor.
On the other hand, Figure 6 is simply an empirical version of a utility function that is well-
defined from the perspective of EUT. If one had selected income domains from Figure 6 such that
some experiments involved tasks where subjects were risk loving, and other experiments involved
tasks in income domains where subjects were risk averse, and then applied a CRRA specification, it
might appear that there had been a shift in risk preferences. But this is simply an artefact of applying
a CRRA specification over an income domain for which CRRA is not globally valid, which is the
fundamental lesson from Holt and Laury [2002]. Thus we see a relatively simple resolution of the
apparent paradox of the “reflection effect” and EUT.
33
It is a simple matter to extend the statistical analysis to allow for heterogeneity. Figure 7
reports the results of a maximum-likelihood estimation in which the r parameter of the EP utility
function depends on the same individual and task characteristics as the CRRA regression analysis in-21-
Table 3. To see the effect of allowing for demographics, we also show the corresponding results
when no individual heterogeneity is allowed for. In both cases in Figure 7 we restrict the sample to
those subjects facing the symmetric frame, to focus on essentials.
The result of allowing for individual heterogeneity is a significant difference in the overall
characterization of risk attitudes. Average RRA is roughly constant over the income ranges
considered here, in contrast to the large changes inferred when assuming homogeneity. In particular,
there is no evidence of significant risk loving behavior at low stake levels. However, there is a
dramatic increase in uncertainty about risk attitudes at low stake levels, such that one cannot rule out
risk neutrality or risk loving behavior. To some extent this is just due to sampling uncertainty when
one evaluates an estimated statistical relationship away from the sample mean stake level, but it also
reflects diverse risk attitudes by subjects differentiated by observable characteristics. Moreover, the
plateau of constant RRA is much lower than when heterogeneity is assumed away. With no
heterogeneity, the characterization indicated extreme risk aversion, with average RRA values close to
2 for medium to higher stake levels. When heterogeneity is allowed for, on the other hand, this
plateau is much more reasonable, and average RRA is well below 1.
Why is there more uncertainty about risk attitudes when one controls for individual
heterogeneity? The reason for this uncertainty is that several of the individual characteristics are
statistically significant, as we found with the CRRA regression analysis. Thus the EP function for
some individuals is significantly different from the EP function for other individuals, so when one
evaluates the RRA for the average individual these differences imply that the average RRA is less
representative of the sample of EP functions. Actually, this “average individual” is literally a
counterfactual, synthetic individual whose characteristics are equal to the average for the sample. For
example, this synthetic individual is 51% female (Table 2), whereas the actual individuals were either
female or they were not. If sex had been a significant determinant of risk attitudes, this would have
been one of the factors causing wider confidence intervals in the right panel of Figure 7.34  An alternative approach to relaxing the predictions of EUT has been to allow for there to be some
stochastic deviation from the prediction of the theory and observed choice. If one assumes homogeneous risk
attitudes, for example, some such assumption is necessary to account for the blunt fact that no two subjects
made the same choices (e.g., see Camerer and Ho [1994; p.186] and HL [2002; p.1652]). Of course, simply
allowing subjects to have different preferences will mitigate the need for this specification. This assumption
has nothing to commend it in theory, and while it is parsimonious that is hardly an advantage when one
considers the need to augment the statistical analysis with ill-motivated noise parameters (as argued eloquently
by Ballinger and Wilcox [1997]). Appendix B discusses this methodological perspective in more detail.
35 Wu and Gonzalez [1996] and Prelec [1998] discuss more general functional forms.
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D.  Variants from the Standard Model
We consider the robustness of our main findings to a popular variant of the standard
expected utility theory model: probability weighting.
34 Expected utility is defined in standard theory
by the probability-weighted utilities of the final prizes of the lotteries the subject makes choices over.
In standard theory expected utility is just a weighted average, where the weights are the probabilities
of the lotteries. Although these are the subjective probabilities, it is reasonable for tasks as simple as
ours to assume that the subjective probabilities are the objective probabilities. An alternative
approach, popularized in the earlier variants of Prospect Theory and due to Edwards [1962], is to
allow the probability weights to be some non-linear function of the objective probabilities. The
original idea, at least as expressed in Kahneman and Tversky [1979; p.274ff.], was that this reflected
some psychological “editing phase” in which the subjects generated a mental representation of the
task.
For a specific functional form, we employed the power function in the gain domain used by
Tversky and Kahneman [1992] and others.
35 Thus the decision weights used instead of probabilities
are the probabilities raised to some power, where that power is to be estimated as part of the overall
maximum-likelihood exercise that also estimates the parameters of the EP utility function. The
results, shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 8, indicate that there is a significant change in the
EP representation: uncertainty about risk attitudes is increased, and although the best estimates for
RRA indicate approximate CRRA, the standard errors are very large. These results are consistent
with the fact that the characterization of risk interacts with the characterization of probabilities, such
that it is not possible to be very precise about one without imposing some constraints on the other.36 Most welfare analyses of government policy are associated with the household, or representative
household types, due to data limitations on economic activities of individuals within the household (e.g., see
Harrison, Jensen, Lau and Rutherford [2001] or Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [2003]). Our results for
individuals can be used to generate weighted averages for households composed of individuals with different
characteristics. However, we caution that risk attitudes for households as decision-making units might very
well differ from simple weighted averages of the risk attitudes of the members of that household. Such
attitudes could be elicited directly using simple variants of the procedures used here, and that is an important
area for future research. But it is not obvious from an individualistic welfare perspective whether it is
methodologically better to use household estimates of risk aversion or individual estimates of risk aversion.
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This finding does not invalidate EUT or the probability-weighting variant, but just serves as a
reminder that allowing flexibility in both appears to “over-determine” these data.
4. Conclusions
We demonstrate that it is possible to elicit attitudes to risk from individuals in the field using
real economic commitments, and that those attitudes are in an a priori plausible range. There are
variations in risk attitudes across significant socio-demographic characteristics of the Danish
population, implying that welfare evaluations of government policies for those individuals should
take these differences into account.
36 We also show that average risk aversion is roughly constant
with respect to the income levels considered here, although there is considerable uncertainty about
specific risk attitudes for “low” income levels. Since those small amounts are in the range of most
laboratory experiments, they imply that experimenters should be concerned about the sensitivity of
the values of risk aversion their subjects might exhibit. On the other, if the approximate constancy
of relative risk aversion for “larger” amounts of income extends beyond the domain of the prizes
used in our experiments, our results imply that CRRA may be a useful characterization for policy
purposes.
Our results consistently support the need to recognize the heterogeneity of risk attitudes
across individual subjects. If one is trying to characterize risk attitudes for our sample as a scalar
value of relative risk aversion, the confidence intervals would be quite wide. Even the choice of
appropriate functional form, and the assumption of constancy of relative risk aversion, depends on-24-
whether one imposes homogenous risk preferences across individuals. But this sensitivity to
specification is just a reflection of the fact that risk attitudes for individuals differ. This result has
important implications for the characterization of risk attitudes in policy applications, theoretical
modeling, and experimental economics.-25-
Table 1: Payoff Matrix in the Holt and Laury Risk Aversion Experiments
Default payoff matrix for scale 1
EV
A EV
B Difference Open CRRA 
Interval if Subject 
Switches to Lottery B
Lottery A Lottery B
p($2) p($1.60) p($3.85) p($0.10)
0.1 $2 0.9 $1.60 0.1 $3.85 0.9 $0.10 $1.64 $0.48 $1.17 -4, -1.71 
0.2 $2 0.8 $1.60 0.2 $3.85 0.8 $0.10 $1.68 $0.85 $0.83 -1.71, -0.95
0.3 $2 0.7 $1.60 0.3 $3.85 0.7 $0.10 $1.72 $1.23 $0.49 -0.95, -0.49
0.4 $2 0.6 $1.60 0.4 $3.85 0.6 $0.10 $1.76 $1.60 $0.16 -0.49, -0.15
0.5 $2 0.5 $1.60 0.5 $3.85 0.5 $0.10 $1.80 $1.98 -$0.17 -0.15, 0.14
0.6 $2 0.4 $1.60 0.6 $3.85 0.4 $0.10 $1.84 $2.35 -$0.51 0.14, 0.41
0.7 $2 0.3 $1.60 0.7 $3.85 0.3 $0.10 $1.88 $2.73 -$0.84 0.41, 0.68
0.8 $2 0.2 $1.60 0.8 $3.85 0.2 $0.10 $1.92 $3.10 -$1.18 0.68, 0.97
0.9 $2 0.1 $1.60 0.9 $3.85 0.1 $0.10 $1.96 $3.48 -$1.52 0.97, 1.37
1 $2 0 $1.60 1 $3.85 0 $0.10 $2.00 $3.85 -$1.85 1.37, 4
Note: The last four columns in this table, showing the expected values of the lotteries and the implied CRRA intervals, were not shown to subjects.-26-
Figure 1: First Level of the iMPL Elicitation Format-27-
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Figure 4: Effect of Initial Menu
on Estimated CRRA in Denmark-30-
Table 2: List of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Standard
Variable Definition Mean Deviation
_____________________________________________________________________
female Female 0.52 0.50
young Aged less than 30 0.17 0.38
middle Aged between 40 and 50 0.28 0.45
old Aged over 50 0.37 0.48
single Lives alone 0.20 0.40
kids Has children 0.29 0.45
nhhd Number of people in the household 2.5 1.16
owner Owns own home or apartment 0.69 0.46
retired Retired 0.16 0.36
student Student 0.092 0.29
skilled Some post-secondary education 0.51 0.50
longedu Substantial higher education 0.37 0.48
IncLow Lower level income 0.34 0.48
IncHigh Higher level income 0.34 0.47
copen Lives in greater Copenhagen area 0.27 0.44
city Lives in larger city of 20,000 or more 0.39 0.49
experimenter Experimenter Anderson (default is Lau) 0.55 0.53-31-
Table 3: Statistical Model of Risk Aversion Responses
Random-effects interval regression,
 with the CRRA interval chosen by the subject as the dependent variable.










Constant  0.28 0.28 0.32 -0.28 0.83
skewLO Skew towards risk loving -0.004 0.11 0.97 -0.21 0.21
skewHI Skew towards risk aversion 0.33 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.55
Task2 Second risk task 0.32 0.06 0.00 0.21 0.44
Task3 Third risk task 0.17 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.29
Task4 Fourth risk task 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.25
experimenter Experimenter effect -0.07 0.09 0.45 -0.25 0.11
female Female -0.05 0.09 0.57 -0.23 0.13
young Aged less than 30 0.21 0.18 0.24 -0.14 0.55
middle Aged between 40 and 50 -0.30 0.14 0.03 -0.57 -0.03
old Aged over 50 -0.13 0.16 0.41 -0.45 0.18
single Lives alone 0.08 0.15 0.57 -0.20 0.37
kids Has children 0.02 0.14 0.87 -0.25 0.30
nhhd Number in household 0.03 0.06 0.63 -0.09 0.15
owner Own home or apartment 0.08 0.12 0.54 -0.17 0.32
retired Retired 0.09 0.15 0.55 -0.20 0.38
student Student 0.33 0.17 0.05 -0.01 0.67
skilled Some post-secondary education 0.45 0.14 0.00 0.18 0.72
longedu Substantial higher education -0.24 0.14 0.09 -0.52 0.04
IncLow Lower level income -0.09 0.12 0.47 -0.33 0.15
IncHigh Higher level income 0.04 0.12 0.71 -0.19 0.28
copen Lives in Copenhagen area 0.13 0.12 0.28 -0.11 0.37
city Lives in larger city of 20,000 or more 0.10 0.11 0.38 -0.12 0.31
sigma_u Standard deviation of random individual effect 0.59 0.04 0.00 0.52 0.66
sigma_e Standard deviation of residual 0.62 0.02 0.00 0.59 0.66
Notes: Log-likelihood value is -3299.7; Wald test for null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero has a P
2 value of 81.45
with 22 degrees of freedom, implying a p-value less than 0.001; fraction of the total error variance due to
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Figure 8: Effect of Probability Weighting on Estimated Risk Attitudes37 Terminal wealth refers here to the wealth that the subject has prior to coming into the lab plus any
income earned in the lab.  Watt [2002] and Palacios-Huerta, Serrano and Volij [2002] argue that the degree of
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Appendix A: Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Theory
A recent theoretical examination of the role of risk aversion and expected utility theory
(EUT) argues that EUT must be rejected for individuals who are risk averse at low monetary stakes.
If true, then further tests of EUT are not needed for those individuals who are found to be risk
averse in these low stake lottery choices. Rabin [2000] proves a calibration theory showing that if
individuals are risk averse over low stakes lotteries then there are absurd implications about the bets
those individuals will accept at higher stakes.  Rabin [2000] and Rabin and Thaler [2001] allege that
this result has general implications for the validity of EUT as a descriptive theory.  As explained by
Rabin and Thaler [2001; p.222, emphasis added]:
The logic behind this result is that within the expected utility framework, turning
down a moderate stakes gamble means that the marginal utility of money must
diminish very quickly. Suppose you have initial wealth of W, and you reject a 50-50
lose $10/gain $11 gamble because of diminishing marginal utility of wealth. Then it
must be that U(W + 11)  -  U(W) # U(W) - U(W-10). Hence, on average you value
each of the dollars between W and W + 11 by at most 10/11 as much as you, on
average, value each of the dollars between W-10 and W. By  concavity, this implies
that you value the dollar W + 11 at most 10/11 as much as you value the dollar W-10.
Iterating this observation, if you have the same aversion to the lose $10/gain $11 bet
at wealth level W + 21, then you value dollar W + 21 + 11 = W + 32 by at most 10/11 as
you value dollar W + 21 - 10 = W + 11, which means you value dollar W + 32 by at most
10/11 × 10/11 . 5/6 as much as dollar W-10. You will value the W + 210
th dollar by at
most 40 percent as much as dollar W-10, and the W + 900
th  dollar by at most 2
percent as much as dollar W-10. In  words, rejecting the 50-50 lose $10/gain $11
gamble implies a 10 percent decline in marginal utility for each $21 in additional
lifetime wealth, meaning that the marginal utility plummets for substantial changes in
lifetime wealth. You care less than 2 percent as much about an additional dollar when
you are $900 wealthier than you are now. This rate of deterioration for the value of
money is absurdly high, and hence leads to absurd risk aversion.
Thus, a problem for EUT does indeed arise if (a) subjects exhibit risk aversion at low stake
levels, and (b) one assumes that utility is defined in terms of terminal wealth.
37 relative risk aversion required for Rabin’s result are a priori implausible. If an individual turned down a small-
stakes gamble with a positive expected return for any wealth level, including high wealth levels, then that
individual must have extremely high relative risk aversion. Hence it could be reasonable for that individual to
turns down more generous gambles at higher stakes.
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If, on the other hand, one assumes utility is defined over income, this critique will not apply. 
Consider the step in the argument that is italicized, and which relies critically on the utility function
being defined in terms of terminal wealth. If utility were defined in terms of income, then one could
not make this step in the argument: all that one could say would be that the person at wealth level
W+21 valued dollar W+11 at most 10/11 as much as he valued the dollar W-10. This is the same
statement made in the first step of the argument, so there is no basis for making inferences about
how the person values much larger stakes.
A careful reading of Rabin [2000] is consistent with this perspective. Consider this passage
(p.1288):
What does explain risk aversion over modest stakes? [...] what is empirically the most
firmly established feature of risk preferences, loss aversion, is a departure from
expected-utility theory that provides a direct explanation for modest-scale risk
aversion. Loss aversion says that people are significantly more averse to losses relative
to the status quo than they are attracted by gains, and more generally that people’s
utilities are determined by changes in wealth rather than absolute levels.
One can accept the second contention from the above, that subjects use experimental income (i.e.,
changes in wealth) rather than absolute levels of wealth as the basis for making decisions,
independent of the first point about the asymmetry of risk attitudes either side of the status quo.
Whether or not one models utility as a function of terminal wealth (EUTw) or income (EUTi)
depends on the setting. Both specifications have been popular. The EUTw specification was widely
employed in the seminal papers defining risk aversion and it’s application to portfolio choice.  The
EUTi specification has been widely employed by auction theorists and experimental economists
testing EUT, and it is the specification we employ here.38  For example, see Camerer and Ho [1994; p.186] and HL [2002; p.1652].
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One is tempted to think that this result is well-known since Markowitz [1952] and Samuelson
[1952; ¶13, p.676], but that may just be a hindsight bias. Cox and Sadiraj [2003] and Rubinstein [2002]
make these points quite clearly.  Cox and Sadiraj [2003] go further to propose a generalization of
EUTw and EUTi that allows initial wealth to be an argument of the utility function along with
income (as long as initial wealth is not simply added to income, which would be EUTw). They also
note that “loss aversion,” the alternative favored by Rabin [2000] and Rabin and Thaler [2001] as a
descriptive model of low-stakes risk aversion, is perfectly consistent with EUTi.
Rubinstein [2002] draws the important connection between adopting an EUTi assumption
and the question of temporal consistency of preferences, since the income that one received in
today’s experiment must be “integrated” in some consistent way with the income received in the past
(viz., wealth prior to the experiment). This suggests links back to the older literature on the “asset
integration hypothesis,” reviewed in this context by Quizon, Binswanger and Machina [1984]. In
other words, just because one adopts an EUTi characterization and thereby avoid the problems
posed by Rabin [2000], one is not free to make any arbitrary assumptions about behavior over time.
The laboratory evidence on this matter has it’s own controversies: see Frederick, Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue [2002] and Coller, Harrison and Rutström [2003].
Appendix B: Representative Decision Maker Models
It has been common in empirical work in risk attitudes and expected utility theory to assume
a representative decision maker.
38 Two significant exceptions to this assumption include Hey and
Orme [1994] and Ballinger and Wilcox [1997]. This assumption amounts to starting with the
assumption that each subject has the same risk attitudes. Since this assumption does “obvious”39 The control data in these three panels, for the 1x problem, are pooled across all task #1 responses.
That is, the task #1 responses in the bottom left panel of Figure A1 are not just the task #1 responses of the
individuals facing the 90x problem. Nothing essential hinges on this at this stage of exposition. This makes no
difference to the points being made here.
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violence to the data when the two are put in the same room, the analyst immediately grabs for one or
other assumption about the “error structure” to account for the data. Within these error structures
are implicit, reduced form models that allow individuals to have differences in preferences or choices,
but these are below the surface.
Since we eschew the representative decision maker assumption from the outset, and it makes
a significant difference to the implied characterization of risk attitudes, it is useful to review one
recent example of its use by Holt and Laury [2002].
Figure A1 shows the main responses in the HL experiments. Consider the top left panel,
which shows the average number of choices of the “safe” option A in each problem. Thus in
problem 1, which is row 1 in Table 1, virtually everyone chooses option A (the safe choice). By the
time the subjects get to problem 10, which is the last row in Table 1, virtually everyone has switched
over to problem B, the “risky” option. The dashed line marked RN shows the prediction if each and
every subject were risk-neutral: in this case everyone would choose option A up to problem 4, then
everyone would choose option B thereafter. The solid line marked 1X shows the observed behavior
in task #1, the low-payoff case in the design of HL. The solid line marked 20X shows the observed
behavior in their task #3, the high-payoff case in which the base payoffs were scaled up by 20. The
top right panel in Figure A1 shows comparable data for the 50x problems, and the bottom left panel
shows comparable data for the 90x problems.
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We examine the bottom-right panel later.
HL proceed with their analysis by looking at the first three pictures and drawing two-40-
conclusions. First, that one has to introduce some “noise” into any model of the data-generation
process, since the observed choices are “smoother” than the risk neutral prediction. A more general
way of saying this is to allow subjects to have a specific degree of risk aversion, but to critically
assume that they all have exactly the same degree of risk aversion. Thus, if subjects were a little risk
averse the line marked RN would shift to the right and drop down a bit to the right, perhaps at
problem 6 or 7 instead of problem 5. Figure A2 illustrates one such case with the 1X responses, using
the average CRRA of the sample as the basis for the representative decision maker model that
assumes some risk aversion. Of course, such an alternative would no longer represent risk-neutral
responses, but it would still drop sharply, and that is the point being made by HL when arguing for a
noise parameter. Second, and related to the previous explanation, the best-fitting line that maintains
the assumption of homogenous risk preferences would have to be a bit to the right of the risk neutral
line marked RN. So some degree of risk aversion, they argue, is needed to account for the location of
the observed averages, quite apart from the need for a noise parameter to account for the smoothness
of the observed averages.
Both conclusions depend critically on the assumption that every subject in the experiment has
the same preferences over risk. The smoothness of the observed averages is easily explained if one
allows heterogenous risk attitudes and no noise at all at the individual level: some people drop down
at problem 4, some more at problem 5, some more at problem 6, and so on. Indeed, if we allowed
each subject to have a CRRA value equal to the mid-point of the interval at which they switched, one
could explain the observed averages perfectly – by construction, in fact. The smoothness that the
eyeball sees in the observed choices of Figures A1 and A2 is just a counterpart of averaging this
heterogeneous process. The fact that some degree of risk aversion is needed for some subjects is
undeniable, from the positive area above the RN line and below the observed choice lines from-41-
problems 5 through 10. But it simply does not follow without further statistical analysis that all
subjects, or even the typical subject, exhibits significant amounts of risk aversion.
These conclusions follow from inspection of each of the first three panels, and just the RN
and observed 1X choice lines in each for that matter. Now turn to the comparison of the low-payoff
(1X) and higher-payoff (20X, 50X or 90X) observed choice lines within each of the first three panels.
The eyeball suggests that the higher-payoff lines are to the right of the 1X lines, which implies that
risk aversion increases as the scale of payoffs increases. But this conclusion requires some measures
of the uncertainty of these averages. Not surprisingly, the standard deviation in responses is the
largest around problems 5 through 7, suggesting that the confidence intervals around these observed
choice lines could easily overlap. Again, this is a matter for an appropriate statistical analysis, not
eyeball inspection of the averages.
Finally, compare the differences between the 1X and higher-payoff  lines as one scans across
the first three panels in Figure A1.  As the payoff scale gets larger, from 20X to 50X and then to 90X,
it appears that the gap widens. That is, if one ignores the issue of standard errors around these
averages, it appears that the degree of risk aversion increases. This leads HL to reject CRRA and
CARA, and to consider generalized functional forms for utility functions that admit of increasing risk
aversion. However, the sample sizes for the 50X and 90X treatments were significantly smaller than
those for the 20X treatment: 38 and 36 subjects, respectively, compared to 268 subjects for the 20X
treatments. So one would expect that the standard errors around the 50X and 90X high-payoff lines
would be much larger than those around the 20X high-payoff lines. This could make it difficult to
statistically draw the eyeball conclusion that scale increases risk aversion.
Finally, one needs to account for the fact that all of the high-payoff data in the HL
experiments was obtained in a task that followed the low-payoff task. Income effects were controlled-42-
for, in an elegant manner (subjects were asked to give up their prior earnings in order to participate in
the higher-payoff task). But there could still be simple order effects due to experience with the qualitative
task. HL recognize the possibility of order effects when discussing why they had the high
hypothetical task before the high real task: “Doing the high hypothetical choice task before high real
allows us to hold wealth constant and to evaluate the effect  of using real incentives. For our
purposes, it would not have made sense to do the high real treatment first, since the careful thinking
would bias the high hypothetical decisions.” The same (correct) logic applies to comparisons of the
second real task with the first real task. Indeed, Harrison, Johnson, McInnes and Rutström [2003a]
demonstrate that there are order effects in the HL data.
The bottom, right panel examines the data collected by HL in task #1 and task #4, which
have the same 1X scale but differ only in terms of the order effect and the accumulated wealth from
task #3. These lines appear to be identical, suggesting no order effect, but a closer statistical analysis
that conditions on the two differences shows that there is in fact an order effect at work.
The implication is that the only reason that the data have to be smoothed by a “noise
parameter” is to correct for the invalidity of the representative decision maker assumption. The fact
that there appears to be some need to allow for changes in (relative or absolute) risk aversion as the
prize of the lottery changes is an important one, but the evidence here is confounded by order
effects. Moreover, the same logic applies in principle to the characterization of choices within a given
scale treatment: within the 1X treatment, for example, prizes varied between $0.10 and $3.85. That
may not be as quantitatively significant as the 90X scaling, but that is a matter for the data to say.
Thus there is no a priori or empirical basis for assuming a noise parameter, providing one does not
want to insist on the representative decision maker assumption, but some basis for considering non-
constant RRA or ARA.-43-
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Figure A2: Observed Choices and Representative Decision Maker
Models in the Holt-Laury Experiments-45-
References
Ballinger, T.  Parker, and Wilcox, Nathaniel T., “Decisions, Error and Heterogeneity,” Economic
Journal, 107, July 1997, 1090-1105.
Battalio, Raymond C.; Kagel, John C., and Jiranyakul, K., “Testing Between Alternative Models of
Choice Under Uncertainty: Some Initial Results,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 3, 1990, 25-50.
Camerer, Colin F., and Ho, Teck-Hua, “Violations of the Betweeness Axiom and Nonlinearity in
Probability,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 8, 1994, 167-196.
Coller, Maribeth; Harrison, Glenn W., and Rutström, E. Elisabet, “Are Discount Rates Constant?
Reconciling Theory and Observation,” Working Paper 3-31, Department of Economics,
College of Business Administration, University of Central Florida, 2003; available at
http://www.bus.ucf.edu/wp/.
Coller, Maribeth, and Williams, Melonie B., “Eliciting Individual Discount Rates,” Experimental
Economics, 2, 1999, 107-127.
Cox, James C., and Sadiraj, Vjollca, “Implications of Small- and Large-Stakes Risk Aversion for
Decision Theory,” Unpublished Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Arizona,
October 2003; available from http://uaeller.eller.arizona.edu/~jcox/papers.html.
Cubitt, Robin P.; Starmer, Chris, and Sugden, Robert, “Dynamic Choice and the Common Ratio
Effect: An Experimental Investigation,” Economic Journal, 108, September 1998, 1362-1380.
Donkers, Bas, and van Soest, Arthur, “Subjective Measures of Household Preferences and Financial
Decisions,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 20(6), 1999, 613-642.
Eckel, Catherine C., and Grossman, Philip J. “Sex and Risk: Experimental Evidence,” in C.R. Plott
and V.L. Smith (eds.), Handbook of Results in Experimental Economics (Amsterdam: North
Holland/Elsevier Press, 2003).
Eckel, Catherine; Johnson, Cathleen, and Montmarquette, Claude, “Will the Working Poor Invest in
Human Capital?  A Laboratory Experiment,” Working Paper 02-01, Social Research and
Demonstration Corporation, February 2002; available from
http://www.srdc.org/english/publications/workingpoor.htm.
Edwards, Ward, “Subjective Probabilities Inferred from Decisions,” Psychological Review, 69, 1962, 109-
135.
Frederick, Shane; Loewenstein, George; and O’Donoghue, Ted, “Time Discounting and Time
Preference: A Critical Review,” Journal of Economic Literature, XL, June 2002, 351-401.
Friedman, David, “Why There Are No Risk Preferrers,” Journal of Political Economy, 89(3), 1981, 600.-46-
Goeree, Jacob K.; Holt, Charles R., and Palfrey, Thomas R., “Quantal Response Equilibria and
Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 104, 2002, 247-272.
Goeree, Jacob K.; Holt, Charles R., and Palfrey, Thomas R., “Risk Averse Behavior in Generalized
Matching Pennies Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 45(1), October 2003, 97-113.
Grether, David M., and Plott, Charles R., “Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal
Phenomenon,” American Economic Review, 69(4), September 1979, 623-648.
Harbaugh, William T.; Krause, Kate, and Vesterlund, Lise, “Risk Attitudes of Children and Adults:
Choices Over Small and Large Probability Gains and Losses,” Experimental Economics, 5, 2002,
53-84.
Harrison, Glenn W., Harstad, Ronald M., and Rutström, E. Elisabet, “Experimental Methods and
Elicitation of Values,” Experimental Economics, 2004 forthcoming.
Harrison, Glenn W; Jensen, Jesper; Lau, Morten Igel, and Rutherford, Thomas F., “Policy Reform
Without Tears,” in A. Fossati and W. Weigard (eds.), Policy Evaluation With Computable General
Equilibrium Models (New York: Routledge, 2001).
Harrison, Glenn W.; Johnson, Eric; McInnes, Melayne M., and Rutström, E. Elisabet, “Risk Aversion
and Incentive Effects: Comment,”  Working Paper 3-19, Department of Economics, College of
Business Administration, University of Central Florida, 2003a; available at
http://www.bus.ucf.edu/wp/.
Harrison, Glenn W.; Johnson, Eric; McInnes, Melayne M., and Rutström, E. Elisabet, “Individual
Choice and Risk Aversion in the Laboratory: A Reconsideration,”  Working Paper 3-18,
Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of Central
Florida, 2003b; available at http://www.bus.ucf.edu/wp/.
Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten Igel; Rutström, E. Elisabet, and Sullivan, Melonie B., “Eliciting
Risk and Time Preferences Using Field Experiments: Some Methodological Issues,” in J.
Carpenter, G.W. Harrison and J.A. List (eds.), Field Experiments in Economics (Greenwich, CT:
JAI Press, Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 10, 2004 forthcoming); available at
http://www.bus.ucf.edu/wp/.
Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten Igel, and Williams, Melonie B., “Estimating Individual Discount
Rates for Denmark:  A Field Experiment,” American Economic Review, 92(5), December 2002,
1606-1617.
Harrison, Glenn W., and List, John A., “Field Experiments” Working Paper 3-12, Department of
Economics, College of Business Administration, University of Central Florida, 2003;
http://www.bus.ucf.edu/wp/.
Harrison, Glenn W.; Rutherford, Thomas F., and Tarr, David G., “Trade Liberalization, Poverty and
Efficient Equity,” Journal of Development Economics, 71, June 2003, 97-128.-47-
Hey, John D., “Experimental Economics and the Theory of Decision Making Under Uncertainty,”
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 27(1), June 2002, 5-21.
Hey, John D., and Orme, Chris, “Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using
Experimental Data,” Econometrica, 62(6), November 1994, 1291-1326.
Holt, Charles A., and Laury, Susan K., “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects,” American Economic
Review, 92(5), December 2002, 1644-1655.
Jianakoplos, Nancy Ammon, and Bernasek, Alexandra, “Are Women More Risk Averse?”, Economic
Inquiry, 36, October 1998, 620-630.
Kagel, John H.; MacDonald, Don N., and Battalio, Raymond C., “Tests of ‘Fanning Out’ of
Indifference Curves: Results from Animal and Human Experiments,” American Economic
Review, 80(4), September 1990, 912-921.
Kahneman, Daniel; Knetsch, Jack L., and Thaler, Richard H., “Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” Journal of Political Economy, 98, December 1990,
1325-1348.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Tversky, Amos, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,”
Econometrica, 1979, 47(2), 263-291.
Kapteyn, Arie, and Teppa, Federica, “Hypothetical Intertemporal Consumption Choices,” Economic
Journal, 113, March 2003, C140-C151.
Kirby, Kris N., and Marakoviƒ, Nino N., “Delay-discounting probabilistic rewards: Rates decrease as
amounts increase,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1996, 3(1), 100-104.
Kirby, Kris N.; Petry, Nancy M., and Bickel, Warren K., “Heroin addicts have higher discount rates
for delayed rewards than non-drug-using controls,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
1999, 128(1), 78-87.
Levin, Irwin P.; Snyder, Mary A., and Chapman, Daniel P., ‘‘The Interaction of Experiential and
Situational Factors and Gender in a Simulated Risky Decision-Making Task,’’ Journal of
Psychology, 122(2), March 1988,173–181.
Laury, Susan K., and Holt, Charles A., “Further Reflections on Prospect Theory,” Working Paper,
Department of Economics, Georgia State University, 2002; available at
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~cah2k/reflect.pdf
Markowitz, Harry, “The Utility of Wealth,” Journal of Political Economy, 60, April 1952, 151-158.
Mitchell, Robert C., and Carson, Richard T., Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent
Valuation Method (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1989).-48-
Murnighan, J. Keith; Roth, Alvin E., and Shoumaker, Francoise, “Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An
Experimental Study,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1(1), March 1988, 101-124. 
Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio; Serrano, Roberto, and Volij, Oscar, “Rejecting Small Gambles Under
Expected Utility,” Working Paper, Brown University, August 2002; available at
http://www.econ.brown.edu/~iph/research.html.
Powell,  Melanie, and Ansic, David, “Gender Differences in Risk Behaviour in Financial Decision-
Making: An Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 18, 1997, 605-628.
Prelec, Drazen, “The Probability Weighting Function,” Econometrica, 66(3), May 1998, 497-527.
Quizon, Jaime B.; Binswanger, Hans P., and Machina, Mark J., “Attitudes Toward Risk: Further
Remarks,” Economic Journal, 94, March 1984, 144-148.
Rabin, Matthew, “Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem,”  Econometrica,
68, 2000, 1281-1292.
Rabin, Matthew and Thaler, Richard, “Anomalies: Risk Aversion,” Journal of Economic  Perspectives, 15,
Winter 2001, 219-232.
Robson, Arthur J., “The Evolution of Attitudes to Risk: Lottery Tickets and Relative Wealth,” Games
and Economic Behavior, 14, 1996, 190-207.
Rubin, P. H., and Paul, C. W., “An Evolutionary Model of Taste for Risk,” Economic Inquiry, 17, 1979,
585–595.
Rubinstein, Ariel, “Comments on the Risk and Time Preferences in Economics,” Unpublished
Manuscript, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 2002; available as
http://www.princeton.edu/~ariel/papers/rabin3.pdf
Samuelson, Paul A., “Probability, Utility, and the Independence Axiom,” Econometrica, 20, 1952, 670-
678.
Schubert, Renate; Brown, Martin; Gysler, Matthias, and Brachinger, Hans Wolfgang, “Financial
Decision-Making: Are Women Really More Risk Averse?” American Economic Review Papers &
Proceedings, 89, May 1999, 381-385.
Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, Daniel, “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation
of Uncertainty,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 1992, 297-323.
Watt, Richard, “Defending Expected Utility Theory,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(2), Spring
2002, 227-228.
Wu, George, and Gonzalez, R., “Curvature of the Probability Weighting Function,” Management
Science, 42, 1996, 1676-1690.